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Abstract: 
In the current paper, we investigate within-couple inequality in earnings using Norwegian register 
data on married and cohabiting couples. We are particularly interested in assessing whether the 
negative relation between children and women’s relative earnings changed during the study period 
2005 to 2014. In this period, work-family policy measures meant to facilitate mothers’ employment 
and promoting fathers’ family involvement were strengthened, and there was a sharp increase in 
women’s level of education. Controlling for demographic and socioeconomic variables, results 
showed that women on average still earn less than their male partners and that the presence of 
small children in the household was negatively related to women’s earnings. However, results from 
interaction models showed that the negative association between having young children and 
women’s relative earnings was reduced during the study period. Additional analyses confirmed that 
this latter finding was mainly due to an income reduction among new fathers. 
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Sammendrag 
Tidligere studier har funnet at kvinner bidrar mindre til parets samlede inntekt enn menn, og at 
kvinners relative inntekt synker når par får barn. Få studier har så langt undersøkt om denne negative 
sammenhengen mellom barn og kvinners relative inntekt har endret seg over tid, og de fleste tidligere 
studier av kvinners relative inntekt har vært begrenset til gifte par eller samboerpar med felles barn. I 
denne artikkelen bruker vi norske registerdata over alle gifte og samboende toinntektspar i alderen 25 
til 59 år og undersøker kvinners bidrag til parets samlede pensjonsgivende inntekt. Vi er særlig 
interessert i å undersøke om betydningen av å ha barn endret seg i perioden 2005 til 2014, en periode 
da familiepolitiske tiltak for å fremme mødres arbeidsdeltakelse og fedres innvolvering i familien ble 
styrket. I denne perioden var det også en klar økning i kvinners utdanningsnivå, også dette en utvikling 
som taler i retning av mindre inntektsulikhet innad i norske par. Resultater fra multivariate analyser 
bekreftet at kvinner i gjennomsnitt fortsatt har lavere pensjonsgivende inntekt enn sine mannlige 
partnere, og at kvinners andel av parets inntekt er lavere når det er små barn i husholdningen 
sammenliknet med foreldrepar med barn i skolealder og barnløse par. Våre resultater viser imidlertid 
at den negative sammenhengen mellom barn og kvinners relative inntekt ble redusert i perioden 2005 
til 2014, en utvikling som i hovedsak skyldes at nye fedre i økende grad reduserer inntekten sin etter at 




With the advance of the dual-earner family, many Western countries have witnessed a notable 
reduction in gender differences in paid and unpaid work in couples in recent decades. Still, women on 
average spend less time on paid employment and more time on domestic work than men (Anxo, 
Mencarini, Pailhé, Solaz, Tanturri, & Flood, 2011) and provide less of the couple’s total income 
(Vitali & Arpino, 2016), and in most countries, parenthood still reinforces a traditional division of 
labour within the household. The Nordic countries with their well-developed policies supporting the 
combination of employment and childcare for men and women are often seen as ideal templates for 
promoting a gender equal dual-earner/dual-carer family model (Esping-Andersen, 2009; Gornick & 
Meyers, 2009). Correspondingly, several studies report a higher prevalence of equal-income couples 
in social-democratic welfare states than in conservative and liberal welfare states (Bianchi, Casper, & 
Peltola, 1999; Vitali & Arpino, 2016; Vitali & Mendola, 2014). 
 
Similarly, the extent to which parenthood intensifies a traditional division of labour and augments 
women’s economic dependence on their partner varies widely between countries (Anxo et al., 2011; 
Vitali & Arpino, 2016). Particularly, work-family policies that support mothers’ employment are seen 
as important in order to lessen the impact of children on gender differences in time allocation (Cooke 
& Baxter, 2010; Dribe & Stanfors, 2009; Gornick & Meyers, 2009), and increase women’s relative 
contribution to the household income (Sani, 2015; Stier & Mandel, 2009). Some also point at the role 
of policies targeted at fathers (Sani, 2015), as well as the diffusion of gender-egalitarian attitudes more 
broadly (Vitali & Arpino, 2016). We pose the following research question: Has the relation between 
parenthood and women’s share of couples’ income weakened in tandem with major family policy 
reforms since the mid-2000s in Norway? 
 
A symmetrical family model where women and men share domestic duties and paid work equally 
between them, has been a central political goal in Norway since the 1970s (Ellingsæter & Leira, 2006; 
Wærness, 2015), and this family model has great support in the general population (Hellevik & 
Hellevik, 2012). Correspondingly, women’s share of the couple’s income has increased considerably 
in Norway in recent decades (Skrede & Wiik, 2012), and  partners’ income contributions are currently 
approximately equal in about half of all co-residential couples in the age group 25-59 years (Bergsvik, 
Kitterød, & Wiik, 2016). Nevertheless, the male partner’s income still surpasses that of the female 
partner in about 45% of couples, and this is more common when there are young children in the 
household (Bergsvik et al., 2016; Skrede & Wiik, 2012). Despite a convergence in men’s and 
women’s time use in the labour market and the family in recent decades, parenthood still strengthens 
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gender-role specialization in couples (Kitterød & Rønsen, 2014) and intensifies the gender gap in 
earnings, wages, and career development in Norway (Barth, Hardoy, Schøne, & Østbakken, 2013; 
Cools & Strøm, 2014; Hardoy, Schøne, & Østbakken, 2017).  
 
Using Norwegian register data on the total population of married and cohabiting couples born 1946 to 
1989, with information on both partners’ annual pensionable income in the period 2005 to 2014, we 
investigate to what extent parenthood, and particularly the presence of small children in the household, 
is related to within-couple inequality in earnings. Specifically, we add to the literature by assessing 
whether the importance of children changed in the period 2005-2014, a period in which work-family 
policy measures that facilitate women’s employment and promote men’s family involvement were 
substantially strengthened (Ellingsæter, 2016). Further, more Norwegian women have completed a 
tertiary education compared with men among those born in the cohorts after 1960 (Statistics Norway, 
2018), altering the socioeconomic composition of couples.  
1.1. Within-couple inequality in income – previous research 
Since the 1980s, a growing body of research has explored women’s and men’s income contributions in 
couples, how this has changed over time and variations across countries, as well as the determinants 
and consequences of gender-equal and gender-unequal arrangements. For instance, in the U.S. 
Sørensen and McLanahan (1987) found that although few women earned as much as their partner, 
only a small minority was completely dependent on their husband’s income. The main determinants of 
economic independency were women’s labour supply and the amount of unearned income (e.g. social 
security). Another early U.S. study found that wives who out-earned their husbands typically held a 
male dominated occupation while the husband had a very flexible job, and there were no children in 
the household (Atkinson & Boles, 1984).   
 
In tandem with the increase in women’s employment and educational attainment in many Western 
countries, the number of studies on the prevalence and characteristics of equal-earning couples and 
couples in which wives out-earn their husbands has grown. These studies demonstrate an increasing 
prevalence of gender-equal earning arrangements, although women still rarely out-earn their partners 
and in a sizeable proportion of couples the male partner has substantially higher earnings than the 
female partner (Bianchi et al., 1999; Raley, Mattingly, & Bianchi, 2006; Skrede & Wiik, 2012; Vitali 
& Mendola, 2014). The small minority of couples in which the woman has the highest income is 
highly heterogeneous, comprising couples where the woman has a well-paid job and/or work long 
hours, as well as couples where the man has health limitations and/or an unstable labour market 
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position (Drago, Black, & Wooden, 2005; Oppenheimer, 1997; Raley et al., 2006; Vitali & Arpino, 
2016; Winkler, McBride, & Courtney, 2005). A recent Norwegian study provides similar results 
(Bergsvik et al., 2016).             
 
Considering that women now outnumber men in higher education in many Western countries and are 
also better educated than their partner in an increasing number of couples, researchers have been 
particularly interested in the breadwinning patterns of this latter couple type (Klesment & Van Bavel, 
2017). Recent Norwegian data show that 38% of first-time mothers in cohorts born 1940 to 1964 had 
the same education level as the fathers, and that the share of parental couples in which the mother had 
the highest level of education increased from 19% for the earliest cohorts to 30% for the most recent 
ones (Kravdal & Rindfuss, 2008). Women in these couples may have a higher earning potential than 
their partner, though several factors may counteract such a development.  
 
On one hand, female breadwinning still violates normative expectations in certain population 
subgroups (Klesment & Van Bavel, 2017; Tichenor, 1999). But most importantly, the persistent 
gender segregation in education and the labour market entails that highly educated women often earn 
less than their male counterparts, and women usually reduce their labour market activity more than 
men when children arrive (Cools & Strøm, 2014; Klesment & Van Bavel, 2017). However, analysing 
couples’ income patterns in 27 countries in 2007 and 2011, Klesment and Van Bavel (2017) found that 
if a woman was better educated than her partner, this increased the odds of her earning more than him, 
and reduced the so-called “motherhood penalty” on women’s relative earnings. Still, this “hypogamy 
bonus” is less pronounced in egalitarian countries than in countries with more conservative gender 
norms (Van Bavel & Klesment, 2017).    
2. Parenthood and couples’ earnings 
The negative association between parenthood and women’s relative earnings, is a consistent finding 
across countries and time periods (Bianchi et al., 1999; Klesment & Van Bavel, 2017; Sani, 2015; 
Stier & Mandel, 2009), though in the US parenthood was less predictive of the wives’s provider role at 
the turn of the century than in previous decades (Raley et al., 2006). The three most common 
explanations for changing provider roles at the arrival of children are couple specialization, relative 
resources and the “doing gender-perspective”. Differentiated gender roles have long been regarded a 
functional necessity for a stable family system (e.g. Parsons, 1949). Similarly, neoclassical economics 
argue that men specialize in paid labor and women in domestic production and reproduction in order 
to maximize the “family utility” (Becker, 1991). Even in egalitarian couples, gender role specialization 
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might be reinforced at the arrival of children due to small but nonetheless significant biological sex 
differences becoming more pronounced in the process of childbearing and child-rearing. The 
persistent gender wage gap further supports the rationality of a gender specific division of work 
(Becker, 1991). Connected to the gender wage gap and women’s and men’s earnings potential, some 
highlight each partners’ options outside the family as decisive for their bargaining power over time use 
after the arrival of children (Angelov, Johansson & Lindahl, 2016).  
 
Even when abandoning comparative advantages and biological arguments, there have traditionally 
been different societal expectations towards mothers and fathers as women have tended to act as 
caretakers and homemakers whereas men have worked outside the home (see also Haaland, Rege, 
Telle & Votruba, 2014). These gender roles might revive when becoming a parent. New parents might 
therefore be more prone to ‘do gender’ than those without children (West & Zimmermann, 1987). In 
addition, there is for sure selection into parenthood, and this selection varies over time. That is, 
childless women, among whom the highly educated are overrepresented (Rindfuss & Kravdal, 2008), 
may for example be particularly career oriented. We assume, however, that this selection argument is 
most relevant for women born before the cohorts of the “educational revolution” in Norway (i.e., 
women born before 1950).  
 
Family policies directly alter the benefits of couple specialization and may accordingly change 
partners bargaining power and/or gradually also change typical gender roles. Several studies confirm 
that the design of a country’s work-family policies is associated with mother’s relative income. For 
instance, analysing women’s economic contribution to the family in 21 countries in the 1990s, Stier 
and Mandel (2009) uncover that higher rates of childcare services, long maternity leave and the 
availability of part time work generally increase women’s labour force participation and thereby their 
share of the couple’s income. However, long maternity leave and the availability of part-time work 
may still maintain unequal working conditions and specialized earning patterns in dual-earner couples 
(Stier & Mandel, 2009).  
 
Investigating whether women in eight European countries faced a reduction of relative earned income 
in the event of a childbirth in the mid-2000s, Sani (2015) finds that the motherhood penalty was 
largest in countries with generous family benefits, such as Sweden and Luxembourg, and smallest in 
countries without generous family benefits, such as Italy, Portugal and Spain. However, when family 
benefits are included in the measured income, the negative relation between children and women’s 
relative earnings disappears. Hence, the extent to which work-family policies affect the relationship 
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between parenthood and the mother’s share of the couple’s income depends on the type of work-
family policy studied and the income measure used. Stier and Mandel (2009) thus suggest exploring 
the effect of policies that affect men’s working hours as well, such as restrictions on overtime work.     
3. Work-family policy and practices in Norway  
The three main ingredients in the Norwegian work-family policies; namely paid parental leave scheme 
with job protection, the childcare system, and the cash-for-childcare benefits, have undergone major 
changes in our study period (see Appendix A for an overview). In this period, elements promoting 
specialized family practices, such as the cash-for-childcare scheme, were gradually reduced, whereas 
the kindergarten coverage and the parental leave scheme, including some weeks reserved for each 
parent, were gradually extended. Both women and men are increasingly expected to pursue continuous 
labour market participation even when they have small children, and fathers are strongly encouraged 
to be more actively involved with their children (Ellingsæter, 2016).  
 
Nevertheless, the family friendly policies in the Nordic welfare states, particularly the generous 
parental leaves and the availability of part-time work, may have some unintended consequences for 
women in the labour market. Examples include concentration of women in public sector-jobs, high 
part-time working rates among women, relatively few women in top positions in industry and 
commerce, and a persistent gender-gap in wages (Datta Gupta, Smith, & Verner, 2008; Mandel & 
Semyonov, 2006). 
 
The paid parental leave in Norway has been considerably extended since the 1990s and as of 2014 it 
was 49/59 weeks with 100/80 percent wage compensation.1 Three weeks before and six weeks after 
delivery are reserved for the mother. In 1993 the four-week fathers’ quota was introduced, to 
strengthen the father-child-relationship and promote gender equality in family-related tasks as well as 
in the labour market (Brandth & Kvande, 2016). The fathers’ quota was adjusted to 5/6/10/12/14/10 
weeks in 2005/2006/2009/2011/2013/2014 (see Appendix A). Until 2009, the fathers’ quota was 
extended by prolonging the total parental leave, whereas extensions thereafter partly or fully came at 
the expense of the shareable part.  
 
Parental benefit entitlements require employment in 6 of the 10 months prior to take up with an 
income equivalent to half the National Insurance basic amount (G) (approximately 5,200 Euros).2 If 
the mother does not fulfil this requirement, she receives a lump sum of approximately 6,650 Euros. 
Entitlement to the fathers’ quota requires that both the father and the mother have earned parental 
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leave rights. Regarding the shareable leave (the weeks that are not reserved for either parent), fathers 
have independent parental leave rights and can draw parental benefit if the mother is occupied in 
employment, enrolled in education, or has severe health limitations.  
 
Norwegian fathers’ use of parental benefit has grown following each extension of the fathers’ quota 
(Fougner, 2012) and also between the extensions (Dahl, Løken, & Mogstad, 2014). Currently, most 
eligible fathers make use of the quota, whereas the shareable part is mostly used by mothers (Kitterød, 
Halrynjo, & Østbakken, 2017). Several Norwegian studies report that fathers acquire improved 
parental skills while on parental leave (Brandth & Kvande, 2016, 2013). There is also evidence that 
the fathers’ quota has a positive long-term effect on fathers’ involvement with their children (Cools, 
Fiva, & Kirkebøen, 2015), and a negative effect on their income (Rege & Solli, 2013). 
 
As for day care, there was long an unmet demand in Norway, particularly for the youngest children 
(see Appendix A). However, following a political agreement in 2003 on the expansion of the day care 
sector, the percentage of children in publicly subsidised day care grew rapidly. By the end of our study 
period (2014), 67% of children aged 1, 91% of children aged 2 and 97% of children aged 3-5 attended 
formal day care (Kitterød, 2016). Following a price cap reform in 2004, the price of formal day care 
was reduced. Consequently, socioeconomic differences in attendance were reduced (Ellingsæter, 
Kitterød, & Lyngstad, 2017).  
 
In the late 1990s, a cash-for-childcare benefit was introduced to enable parents to spend more time 
with their children, obtain more flexibility in their childcare choices and distribute public transfers 
more equally between users and non-users of subsidized childcare (St.prp. no. 53 1997-98). Parents 
with children aged 1-2 who did not use state-funded childcare were entitled to the benefit and part-
time users could have a reduced benefit. Since 2012 only parents with children below two years of age 
have been entitled to the benefit (see Appendix A). In 1999, the benefit was claimed for as many as 
three quarters of children aged 1-2 years, but over the years, the take-up rate has diminished and in 
2014 parents claimed the benefit for only 23 percent of the children of an eligible age (Egge-Hoveid, 
2015). Several studies report negative reform effects on mothers’ labour supply both during and 
beyond the period when children are eligible for the benefit (Drange & Rege, 2013; Rønsen, 2009). 
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4. Women’s and men’s employment 
Women’s employment has risen sharply in the past decades in Norway. In 2014, 81% of women in the 
age group 25-54 years were gainfully employed compared with 86% of men. The comparable shares 
in 2005 were 76% (women) and 86% (men) (see Appendix B). Currently, 60% of women work full 
time, but only 10% work long hours (> 39 hours per week), and part-time work is still quite common. 
However, there are few full-time housewives in Norway (Kitterød & Rønsen, 2013). Unlike women, 
men in the age group 25-54 years rarely work part-time, but one in four works long hours. 
Interestingly, we note that the unemployment rate was low during our study period and did not 
increase dramatically following the economic crisis in 2008/2009 neither for women nor men (see 
Appendix B).  
 
Women’s and men’s different working hours are partly related to the gender segregation in the 
Norwegian labour market, with women being overrepresented in the public sector and in education, 
health, and social work and men in the private sector and in manufacturing and finance (Reisel & 
Teigen, 2014). Though public-sector jobs are often regarded as more family friendly than private 
sector jobs, female-dominated professions in the service sector are often lower paid than male-
dominated professions (Reisel & Teigen, 2014). Mothers are more likely to work in the public sector 
than childless women, and the difference increases with the number of children and is more 
pronounced in typical childbearing ages (Schøne, 2015). Women are also underrepresented in 
management positions in Norway, and the gender gap increases at the arrival of the first child (Hardoy 
et al., 2017). However, women now enter paid work faster after childbirth than in the 1990s (Rønsen 
& Kitterød, 2015), and only women with children under the age of two now spend less time in 
employment than women with teenagers and those with no children in the household (Kitterød, 2016). 
Also, men with children under the age of two spend somewhat less time in employment than those 
with teenagers or no children at home, but this is a quite recent pattern in Norway (Kitterød, 2016). 
5. Hypotheses 
Based on previous research and given the lingering gendered nature of the labour market, we expect to 
find that Norwegian women on average still earn less than their male partners (Hypothesis 1). Next, 
regarding parenthood, we expect particularly the presence of small children in the household to 
intensify the within-couple inequality in earnings. That is, women in couples with small children 
below school-ages have lower relative earnings than their counterparts with older children and the 
childless (Hypothesis 2a). However, given the comprehensive expansion of the fathers’ quota in our 
study period, coupled with the rise in children’s daycare attendance and diminished use of the cash for 
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care benefit, we expect to find that the motherhood penalty on women’s relative earnings has been 
reduced over time (Hypothesis 2b). The fact that the presence of small children currently is less 
negatively related to women’s employment than previously, while fathers now scale back their 
employment somewhat when they have small children, substantiates this expectation. To clarify, we 
expect the reduced gap in mothers’ and fathers’ earnings during the study period to be driven by two 
parallel developments, namely a weakened association of having young children on female earnings 
(Hypothesis 3a) and an emerging negative association between fatherhood and male earnings during 
the study period (Hypothesis 3b).  
6. Method 
6.1. Data and sample 
We utilize rich data from Norwegian administrative registers covering yearly observations for the 
period 2005-2014. This period was chosen because cohabiting couples without common children can 
be identified in the administrative registers from 2005 onwards. The sample comprises women and 
men in the age-group 25-59 years who are registered living with a partner (married or cohabiting). 
Given our interest in dual-earner couples, and the heterogenenity of those with no income, we focus on 
couples where both partners at least have a pensionable income equivalent to the National Insurance 
basic amount (G) (approximately 10,400 Euros in 2014). In total, our sample includes 6,048,429 
couple observations for the whole study period and 615,897 unique couples in 2014.3 
 
Using a system of universal ID numbers, we linked these household data, including union status and 
age and number of children in the household, to register data on each partner’s sociodemographic 
characteristics such as pensionable income, education (level and field), and country of birth.  
6.2. Dependent variable and analytical strategy 
Our main dependent variable, women’s share of the couple’s income, was measured continuously as 
her percentage of the couple’s total pensionable income. Pensionable income is the sum of labour 
income and income from self-employment, and transfers replacing such incomes, such as parental 
benefits, sickness benefits and benefits for occupational rehabilitation. These benefits are included 
because they are important for household income and pension rights as well as sick-leave or 
unemployment benefit rights. Given the continuous dependent variable, we used ordinary least squares 
regression (OLS). We start by analysing the impact of parenthood on women’s relative earnings in 
2014, focusing on the role of having very small children (i.e., 0-1 years). Next, to examine possible 
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secular changes in women’s relative earnings, we used data covering the entire study period (2005-
2014). To investigate whether the within-couple earning inequality was reduced among new parents 
across the study period, we interacted calendar year and age of the youngest child in the household. To 
answer our last hypotheses about the different developments of mothers’ and fathers’ incomes during 
the study period, we ran the same models for estimating average marginal effects on women’s and 
men’s absolute incomes respectively.  
6.3. Independent variables 
Age of the youngest child in the household and calendar year (2005-2014) constitute our explanatory 
variables. We distinguish between couples whose youngest child was 0-1 years, 2-3 years, 4-5 years, 
6-19 years, and those with no children at all or children living outside the household (reference). 
Further, we included a continuous variable measuring the number of children 0-19 years in the 
household. Calendar Year was included in the analyses as a set of dummies.  
 
To account for changing compositions of couples during the study period as well as selection into 
parenthood by individual and couple-level characteristics, we included a set of covariates that are 
associated with income dynamics in couples and our explanatory variables (e.g., Raley et al., 2006; 
Sani, 2015; VanBavel & Klesment, 2017). First, we measure the union status of the couple, with 
values married (0) and cohabiting (1). Next, women’s level of education was grouped into the 
following four categories: 1) primary school (≤10 years), 2) secondary school (11-13 years) 
(reference), 3) short university education (14–17 years), and 4) long university education (≥18 years). 
Regarding the relative education of couples, we differentiate between couples where the partners have 
the same level of education (1) and couples where either the male (2) or the female (3) partner has 
most education. Further, type of education (both partners) reflects which type of segment in the labour 
market a specific educational qualification fits best.4 This variable has the following six categories 1) 
elementary or secondary education without occupational specialisation and missing, 2) female-
dominated occupations in public sector, 3) female-dominated occupations in private sector, 4) gender-
mixed occupations with little occupation specificity, 5) gender-mixed occupations with high 
occupation specificity, and 6) male-dominated occupations, mostly in the private sector. 
 
Partners’ age was measured in years at the end of each calendar year. We also include squared terms 
to capture possible nonlinearities. We further included partners’ country of birth separating between 
those born in Norway or in another country in the EU/EEA region plus the United States, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand on the one hand, and those born in European countries outside the 
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EU/EEA region plus Asia, Africa, Latin America, and remaining countries in Oceania, on the other. 
The variable has four categories: 1) Both partners born in the EU/EEA region etc. (reference), 2) she 
born in Asia, Africa etc. and he born in the EU/EEA-region etc., 3) he born in Asia, Africa etc. and she 
born in the EU/EEA region etc., and 4) both born in Asia, Africa etc.  
7. Results 
Descriptive statistics for the analytic sample are presented in Table 1. In 2014, 13% of these co-
residential dual earner couples aged 25-59 had children below 2 years, whereas another 19% had 
children in the age group 2-5 years. Most couples (40%) had children in school ages and above, 
whereas 27.5% of couples were childless or had adult children not living in the household. We further 
note that the average number of children in our sample was 1.4 and that 33% of couples were 
cohabiting. Regarding women’s level of education, 13% had completed a compulsory education and 
34% were secondary educated. 38% had completed a lower level tertiary education, whereas 12% had 
completed a long university education. We further see from Table 1 that 44% of couples were 
educational homogamous, and that the woman had more education than the man in most educationally 
heterogamous couples.  
 
Regarding type of education, 23% of men and women alike had lower educations with no occupational 
specialization. Among men, we find the highest share with educations qualifying for occupations in 
male dominated profession (46.5%). Women, on the other hand, most often held educations targeted at 
female dominated occupations in the public sector (29.2%) and gender-mixed specialized occupations 
(23.8%). Next, women were on average 40.9 years old compared with 43.3 years among men. 90% of 




Table 1. Descriptive statistics of variables used. Married and cohabiting dual-earner couples 
aged 25-59 years. 2014 
Variable % / M N 
Youngest child in household   
0-1 year 13.0 80,273 
2-3 years 10.9 67,117 
4-5 years 8.3 51,145 
6-19 years 40.3 248,249 
No child(ren) living in household 27.5 169,113 
Number of child(ren) 0-19 years  1.39 615,897 
Union status   
Married 67.2 413,883 
Cohabiting 32.8 202,014 
Woman’s education level   
Primary 13.4 82,273 
Secondary 34.2 210,536 
University, short 37.9 233,531 
University, long 12.5 76,894 
Missing 2.1 12,663 
Couple’s education   
Homogamous 43.9 270,177 
He<her 31.0 191,183 
He>her 21.7 133,675 
Missing 3.4 20,862 
Woman’s type of education   
Lower, no specialization / missing 23.4 143,937 
Female dominated, public sector 29.2 179,682 
Female dominated, private sector 9.1 56,070 
Gender-mixed, no specialization 6.2 38,301 
Gender-mixed, specialization 23.8 146,573 
Male-dominated 8.3 51,334 
Man’s type of education   
Lower, no specialization / missing 23.3 143,256 
Female dominated, public sector 5.7 34,972 
Female dominated, private sector 4.8 29,750 
Gender-mixed, no specialization 4.5 27,855 
Gender-mixed, specialization 15.2 93,572 
Male-dominated 46.5 286,492 
Woman’s age 40.9 615,897 
Man’s age 43.3 615,897 
Partners’ country of birth   
Both EU/EEA-region etc. 90.0 554,200 
She Asia, Africa etc., he EU/EEA-region etc. 3.8 23,098 
He Asia, Africa etc., she EU/EEA-region etc. 1.7 10,549 
Both Asia, Africa etc. 4.6 28,050 
N  615,897 
 
As shown in Table 2, there was a sharp increase in the incomes of women as well as men during the 
study period. Still, the increase from 2005 to 2014 was higher for women (33%) than for men (24%). 
Further, among women, mothers with children in school ages and above had the highest income 
increase (37%). Conversely, mothers with children below 2 years (30%) as well as women without 
children living in the household (28%) displayed the lowest increase. Among men we see the same 
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development across the study period: Fathers whose youngest resident children were in school ages 
and above displayed the highest income increase (26%) whereas their counterpart with children below 
2 years (21%) as well as those without resident children (22%) had the lowest. Note that parental leave 
benefits are included in our income measure, and that these benefits substitute some of the income of 
those with infants. 
 
Table 2. Women's and men's yearly mean income 2005-2014, by age of the youngest resident 
child. Fixed 2014 NOK. Married and cohabiting dual-earner couples aged 25 to 59 
 Income per year % change  
2005-2014  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Women            
0-1 year 300,178 308,342 326,485 342,032 352,126 354,046 368,227 380,049 385,823 390,313 30 
2-3 years 315,411 327,424 350,090 366,056 376,208 378,021 389,499 404,750 413,944 418,673 33 
4-5 years 317,896 328,445 352,222 370,436 383,449 385,443 401,956 415,960 423,169 429,812 35 
6-19 years 336,821 346,494 369,680 387,202 398,573 402,501 420,712 438,686 450,879 460,295 37 
No children  336,021 341,969 361,543 375,399 383,403 385,771 399,614 413,131 422,102 429,157 28 
All  328,254 336,939 358,367 374,455 384,693 387,458 403,016 418,342 428,122 435,557 33 
Men            
0-1 year 502,838 515,000 552,290 574,604 572,887 566,874 582,954 600,714 608,010 609,966 21 
2-3 years 513,453 533,707 565,465 590,650 587,242 584,761 604,874 619,580 627,408 631,953 23 
4-5 years 524,386 537,035 578,571 600,461 603,603 598,978 619,667 638,976 649,124 654,309 25 
6-19 years 550,783 559,392 599,398 624,470 626,005 625,117 650,666 673,637 686,173 696,582 26 
No children  504,526 511,182 544,665 563,135 564,853 561,455 583,136 601,347 611,603 617,788 22 
All 525,026 535,285 572,639 595,380 596,317 593,549 615,731 635,474 646,002 653,104 24 
N  586,374 590,201 595,622 602,638 605,701 609,363 612,310 614,006 616,317 615,897 6,048,429 
 
Regarding women’s share of couples’ total income; we see from Figure 1 that women on average 
contributed more in 2014 than in 2005. More precisely, women’s share of the household income 
increased with 1.2 percentage points over the study period, from 39.9% in 2005 to 41.1% in 2014. 
Separating between couples with and without children, we further note from Figure 1 that the increase 
in women’s share of couples’ income was slightly larger among couples with children below 2 years 
than among couples with children in school ages and above and the childless. Notwithstanding the 
overall increase in women’s income contribution, the results are in line with our first hypothesis 




Figure 1. Women's share of the couple's income, 2005-2014, by age of the youngest resident 
child. Fixed 2014 NOK. Married and cohabiting dual-earner couples aged 25 to 59 
(N=6,048,429) 
 
7.1. Multivariate results 2014 
Results from multivariate models for dual-earner marital and cohabiting couples in 2014 are 
presented in Table 3. First, as shown in Model 1, in 2014 women in couples whose youngest 
child was 1 year or younger contributed with 2.4 percentage points less to couples’ total income than 
women without children in the household. As expected, the negative association between parenthood 
and women’s relative earnings was less negative the older the youngest child was. For instance, 
among couples where the youngest child was 6-19 years old, women on average contributed with 1.2 










2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Year
0-1 years 2-3 years 4-5 years
6-19 years No children in HH All couples
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Table 3. Multivariate models of women’s relative income. OLS. Married and cohabiting dual-
earner couples aged 25 to 59. 2014 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B SE B SE 
Youngest child in household     
0-1 year -2.39 0.05 -1.64 0.07 
2-3 years -1.58 0.06 -0.58 0.07 
4-5 years -1.57 0.06 -0.38 0.08 
6-19 years -1.22 0.04 (-0.10) 0.06 
No child(ren) living in household Ref 
 
Ref  
Number of child(ren) 0-19 years  
 
 -0.76 0.02 
Union status     
Married    -1.65 0.04 
Cohabiting   Ref  
Woman’s education level     
Primary   0.45 0.07 
Secondary   Ref  
University, short   1.39 0.05 
University, long   3.44 0.06 
Missing   -4.46 0.18 
Couple’s education     
Homogamous   Ref  
He<her   3.23 0.04 
He>her   -3.81 0.05 
Woman’s type of education     
Lower, no specialization / missing   Ref  
Female dominated, public sector   -0.53 0.07 
Female dominated, private sector   -0.38 0.07 
Gender-mixed, no specialization   -1.13 0.09 
Gender-mixed, specialization   0.89 0.07 
Male-dominated   2.16 0.08 
Man’s type of education     
Lower, no specialization / missing   Ref  
Female dominated, public sector   4.24 0.08 
Female dominated, private sector   0.33 0.08 
Gender-mixed, no specialization   3.82 0.09 
Gender-mixed, specialization   -1.35 0.06 
Male-dominated   -1.71 0.05 
Woman’s age   1.23 0.02 
Woman’s age squared   -0.01 0.00 
Man’s age   -0.92 0.02 
Man’s age squared   0.01 0.00 
Partners’ country of birth     
Both EU/EEA-region etc   Ref  
She Asia, Africa etc., he EU/EEA etc.   -2.52 0.08 
He Asia, Africa etc., she EU/EEA etc.   4.87 0.12 
Both Asia, Africa etc.   3.10 0.08 
Constant 42.24 0.03 36.74 0.44 
N 615,897 615,897 
Note: Estimates not in brackets p < .0001 
 
Including relevant demographic and socioeconomic variables in Model 2, the negative association 
between the presence of children in the household and women’s relative earnings persisted. On 
average, each child in a household (0-19 years) was associated with a 0.76 percentage points lower 
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female income share. In addition, controlling for the number of children, union type, women’s 
education, couples’ relative education, his and her type of education, age, and partners’ global region 
of origin, the presence of a small child below 2 years in the household was associated with a 1.6 
percentage points lower female income share. Mothers with a youngest child in the age group 2-3 
years and 4-5 years had respectively 0.6 and 0.4 percentage points lower relative incomes. Taken 
together, these results are in accordance with Hypothesis 2a claiming that women in couples with 
small children have lower relative earnings than their counterparts with older children and those 
without resident children. 
 
Regarding the other variables included in Model 2 in Table 3, we first note that in 2014 married 
women contributed significantly less to the household income than their cohabiting counterparts. Not 
surprising, university educated women had earnings more similar to their male partners than high 
school educated women. Regarding couple’s education, the results for 2014 confirm that when the 
woman had completed a higher education than her partner, she on average had a 3.2 percentage points 
higher income share than women in educational homogamous couples. In couples where he had a 
higher education than her, on the other hand, she contributed with 3.8 percentage points less, 
confirming that both partners’ educational level is an important factor for within-couple income 
inequality. The same holds for type of education. Women with educations qualifying for female 
dominated professions as well as gender mixed non-specialized occupations had significantly lower 
relative earnings than their counterparts with lower educations with no occupational specialization. 
Women who had completed educations targeted at male dominated professions, on the other hand, had 
1.8 percentage points higher relative earnings, net of the other variables included. Conversely, if the 
man held an education qualifying for a female dominated profession, especially in the public sector, 
this was related to a statistically significant higher relative income of the woman. If he held an 
education targeted at jobs in male dominated professions or specialized gender mixed occupations, this 
was negatively related to the woman’s relative income.  
7.2. Multivariate results 2005-2014 
In Models 3 and 4 of Table 4 data for the years 2005 to 2014 are used. In Model 3 we only include the 
variable measuring the age of the youngest child and calendar year. As can be seen from this baseline 
model, there was a negative relation between having small children in the household and women’s 
relative earnings for the whole study period. From 2009 on women’s relative income was significantly 
higher than it had been in 2005. Including relevant demographic and socioeconomic variables in 
Model 4, differences between the years were modified, confirming that part of the general increase in 
19 
women’s relative income in the study period was due to changes in for example educational 
composition. At the same time, the motherhood penalty on women’s relative earnings persisted.  
 
Table 4. Multivariate models of women’s relative income. OLS. Married and cohabiting dual-
earner couples aged 25 to 59. 2005-2014 
 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable B SE B SE 
Youngest child in household     
0-1 year -2.72 0.02 -1.91 0.02 
2-3 years -1.87 0.02 -0.74 0.02 
4-5 years -1.97 0.02 -0.58 0.03 
6-19 years -1.49 0.01 -0.10 0.02 
No child(ren) living in household Ref 
 
Ref  
Number of child(ren) 0-19 years  
 
 -0.93 0.01 
Union status     
Married   -1.69 0.01 
Cohabiting   Ref  
Woman’s education level     
Primary   0.76 0.02 
Secondary   Ref  
University, short   1.62 0.01 
University, long   3.74 0.02 
Missing   -5.24 0.07 
Couple’s education     
Homogamous   Ref  
He<her   3.34 0.01 
He>her   -4.06 0.01 
Missing     
Woman’s type of education     
Lower, no specialization / missing   Ref  
Female dominated, public sector   -0.69 0.02 
Female dominated, private sector   -0.46 0.02 
Gender-mixed, no specialization   -1.57 0.03 
Gender-mixed, specialization   0.62 0.02 
Male-dominated   1.84 0.02 
Man’s type of education     
Lower, no specialization / missing   Ref  
Female dominated, public sector   4.45 0.03 
Female dominated, private sector   0.61 0.02 
Gender-mixed, no specialization   4.06 0.03 
Gender-mixed, specialization   -1.38 0.02 
Male-dominated   -1.17 0.01 
Woman’s age   1.30 0.01 
Woman’s age squared   -0.02 0.00 
Man’s age   -0.94 0.01 
Man’s age squared   0.01 0.00 
Partners’ country of birth     
Both EU/EEA-region etc   Ref  
She Asia, Africa etc., he EU/EEA etc.   -2.40 0.03 
He Asia, Africa etc., she EU/EEA etc.   4.87 0.04 
Both Asia, Africa etc.   3.36 0.03 
Calendar year     
2005 Ref  Ref  
2006 (-0.02) 0.02 -0.09 0.02 
20 
 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable B SE B SE 
2007 -0.10 0.02 -0.25 0.02 
2008 (0.07) 0.02 -0.18 0.02 
2009 0.60 0.02 0.28 0.02 
2010 0.83 0.02 0.42 0.02 
2011 0.92 0.02 0.41 0.02 
2012 1.00 0.02 0.39 0.02 
2013 1.12 0.02 0.42 0.02 
2014 1.28 0.02 0.47 0.02 
Constant 41.18 0.02 35.59 0.14 
N 6,048,429 6,048,429 
Note: Estimates not in brackets p < .0001 
 
We further set out to investigate whether the negative association between having (small) children and 
women’s relative income has been reduced across the study period (Hypothesis 2b). For ease of 
interpretation, adjusted predictions (Williams, 2012) from this model are illustrated in Figure 2 (full 
model results available upon request). In this figure, the adjusted overall trend in women’s income 
shares as well as different developments between women in couples with and without (young) children 
are of interest. In accordance with Hypothesis 2b, results clearly confirm that women’s share of 
couples’ income increased among couples with resident children, net of other measured changes in 
their characteristics and composition during the study period.  
 
As shown in Figure 2, the increase in women’s relative income was particularly evident among 
couples whose youngest resident child was below school ages. Notably, in couples with child(ren) 
below two years, women’s relative income prediction rose from 38.6% in 2005 to 39.4% in 2014. A 
similar reduction of within-couple earning inequality was found among couples with older resident 
children. More precisely, in tandem with the constant improvement of day care coverage in Norway 
(see Appendix A) women in couples whose youngest resident child was between 2 and 5 years 
increased their predicted relative income most constant over the study period from 39.7/39.8% in 2005 
to around 40.5/40.7% in 2014. Among couples without resident child(ren), on the other hand, 
women’s relative income remained stable at a high level (around 41%), despite a decrease until 2008. 
In sum these developments reduced the differences in relative earnings between women in couples 
with and without (small) children.  
 
Considering the timing of changes within the study period, there were interesting parallels to the 
implementation of family policies. Whereas the (net) female income shares were declining or stable in 
all groups until 2007/2008, the largest rise occurring in 2009 overlaps with the implementation of the 
largest expansion of the ‘daddy quota’ (from 6 to 10 weeks) and the time, when 1-year-olds were 
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guaranteed public day-care (see Appendix A). As shown in Figure 2, this within-couple inequality 
reduction was most distinct among couples with the youngest children (0-1 years), which are those 
immediately affected by these policies. Correspondingly, the increase in women’s relative income was 
less distinct among the childless and those with older children.  
 
Figure 2. Results from multivariate OLS model of women’s relative income. Adjusted 
predictions with 95% confidence intervals. Married and cohabiting dual-earner couples aged 25 
to 59. 2005-2014 (N=6,048,429) 
 
Note: Model controlled for couples’ number of children, union type, women’s education, couples’ relative 
education, his and her type of education, age, and partners’ global region of origin. 
 
Finally, to assess our two hypotheses arguing that the reduced gender gap in parental earnings was 
driven both by a reduced motherhood penalty (Hypothesis 3a) and an emerging fatherhood penalty 
(Hypothesis 3b), Figure 3 presents results from models estimating developments in the absolute annual 
incomes of fathers’ (left panel)’ and mothers’ (right panel) separately. Because time trends in absolute 
incomes are of interest only in so far as they are diverging between couples with children of different 
ages compared to the reference group, the results are shown as Average Marginal Effects (Williams 
2012). In this figure, men and women without (resident) children serve as reference, ensuring that the 
general income development is not disturbing the different developments among those with children 
of different ages.  
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Figure 3. Results from multivariate OLS models of men’s and women’s annual incomes (in 
2014-NOK). Average marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals. By age of youngest 
resident child. Married and cohabiting dual-earner couples aged 25 to 59. 2005-2014 
(N=6,048,429) 
 
Note: Models controlled for couples’ number of children, union type, women’s education, couples’ relative 
education, his and her type of education, age, and partners’ global region of origin. 
 
As shown in Figure 3, the predicted income of men with resident children below school ages declined 
markedly after 2008 compared to their counterparts without children in the household, supporting the 
assumption that the reduced gap in within-couple earnings is a result of an emerging fatherhood 
penalty (Hypothesis 3b). Conversely, men with resident children above school ages constantly 
improved their income compared to those without children (in 2014 they earned 33 000 NOK more on 
average than the latter group). 
 
Although the presence of small children currently is less negatively related to women’s employment 
than previously (Kitterød, 2016), the findings presented in Figure 3 do not support Hypothesis 3a 
claiming that the gap in mothers’ and fathers’ earnings is reduced during the study period due to a 
weakened association between having young children and female earnings. Instead, what we see for 
fathers, and somewhat less pronounced also for mothers, is a divergence of the incomes of those with 
young children, on the one hand, and those with children in school ages, on the other. 
8. Summary and discussion 
The extent, to which work-family policies affect the relationship between parenthood and women’s 
share of couples’ income, has been an important research topic in several countries in recent years. 
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Numerous studies suggest that work-family policies that encourage mothers’ employment may lessen 
the negative impact of children on women’s relative income in couples (Sani, 2015; Stier & Mandel, 
2009), but less is known about the role of policies that affect fathers’ employment and income (Stier & 
Mandel, 2009). In this paper, we used register data on the total population of dual-earning married and 
cohabiting couples ages 25 to 59 to investigate within-couple inequality in earnings in Norway, a 
social democratic country with high gender-equality ambitions and extensive work-family policies that 
may affect both parents’ employment. We were particularly interested in assessing whether the 
importance of children changed during the study period 2005 to 2014, when work-family policy 
measures facilitating mothers’ employment and encouraging fathers’ family involvement were 
considerably strengthened. Of particular importance is the rapid expansion of affordable and high-
quality day-care for children, including the youngest ones, as well as the extension of the fathers’ 
quota in the parental leave scheme from five to 14 weeks. The period was also characterised by a 
sharp increase in women’s educational level.   
 
In line with these developments, our results showed that women’s relative income increased across the 
study period. Nonetheless, in 2014, women’s share of couples’ income was on average 41%, up from 
40% in 2005, underlining that women on average still earn less than their male partners. Separating 
between couples with and without resident children, results confirmed that having children was 
negatively related to women’s relative earnings. Controlling for relevant demographic and 
socioeconomic variables, in 2014 each child in the household (0-19 years) was associated with a 0.76 
percentage points lower female income share. The presence of a small child below 2 years in the 
household gave an additional 1.6 percentage points lower female income share. Mothers with a 
youngest child in the age group 2-3 years and 4-5 years had respectively 0.6 and 0.4 percentage points 
lower relative incomes. Taken together, women in couples with small children have lower relative 
earnings than their counterparts with older children and those without resident children. This finding is 
in line with extant studies showing that mothers, and particularly those with small children, still spend 
significantly more time on family work, particularly routine housework, than fathers (Kitterød & 
Rønsen, 2014). 
 
However, we also showed that the negative association between having (young) children and women’s 
relative earnings was reduced during the study period. The increase in women’s share of the couples’ 
income was largest among couples with small children below 2 years and particularly evident during 
the years with major extensions of the fathers’ quota and of day care coverage for young children. This 
striking simultaneity and the heterogeneous development across couples with children of different 
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ages may indicate that the extensive parental leave scheme and childcare arrangements in Norway 
have reduced within-couple inequality in earnings after the arrival of a child.  
 
At the same time, our analyses revealed that the convergence of income in couples seems to be driven 
by an emerging fatherhood penalty. That is, the reduction in new fathers’ income was more 
pronounced over the study period than the expected catch up of new mothers’ incomes. This aligns 
with previous studies, finding that family policies aimed at new fathers, as the introduction of the 
‘daddy quota’, have effects on their incomes (Cools & Strøm, 2014; Rege & Solli 2013). Our study 
might indicate a continued impact of policy extensions for the reduction of within-couple inequality in 
earnings. To be sure, our data did not reveal whether this is due to a reduction in hours worked or 
differential pay increases. But several Norwegian studies have found evidence of more involved 
fatherhood, partly explained by the fathers’ quota (Brandth & Kvande, 2016; Kitterød, 2016), and it is 
interesting that having young children seems increasingly relevant also for new fathers’ incomes.  
 
Although gender specialization, measured as economic contributions to the household income, has 
started to weaken, the gender gap in earnings in couples is still clearly present and most distinct among 
couples with the youngest children. This partly reflects general labour market conditions (persistent 
gender segregation and gender pay gap), but clearly also persisting gendered time allocations after the 
arrival of a child. Women still use most of the shareable parental leave and more often reduce their 
working hours and switch to jobs in the public sector than men (Kitterød et al., 2017), even though 
their education in many cases surpasses that of their partners.  
 
Further, finding that the reduction in incomes of fathers of young children is not accompanied by an 
increase in the incomes of mothers of young children, the consequence will be an increase of income 
inequality between households with young children and those without. More gender equality will then 
come at the cost of increasing inequality between families with and without young children. In a 
similar manner, increased economic homogamy due to more equal sharing among partners has been 
shown to contribute to greater economic inequality between households (Gonalons-Pons & Schwartz, 
2017). 
 
The general decrease in the within-couple earning gap after 2008 might be related to the 2008/2009 
financial crisis. That is, as men more often than women are employed in private sector jobs, their 
wages may have been more affected than women’s. However, the financial crisis cannot explain why 
the income developments were so heterogeneous between men with younger versus older children. As 
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first family formation often overlaps with the establishing phase in the labour market, (perceived) 
economic uncertainty could nonetheless strengthen a parenthood penalty or make selection into 
parenthood versus pursuing a career more salient (e.g., Hofmann & Hohmeyer, 2013; Ranjan, 1999). 
This is, however, highly speculative given the relatively low impact of the economic crisis in Norway 
and nothing our data can reveal. For the Norwegian case we note that the unemployment rate was low 
during our study period and did not increase dramatically following the economic crisis in 2008/2009 
neither for women nor men (see Appendix B). 
 
Still, the data used for assessing change over time were cross-sectional, which means we did not 
follow the same couples over time to assess how parenthood changed their income (e.g., Hart, 2015). 
Hence, the composition of these couples and the selection into parenthood may have varied over time 
and by other characteristics than those that we have discussed and accounted for. What we interpret as 
an emerging fatherhood penalty, could in fact be the result of different men becoming fathers. Indeed, 
we would observe the same pattern if men with higher earnings and career ambitions would forego 
fatherhood due to increased parenting demands. Empirical evidence from Norway does, however, 
point in the opposite direction as it is increasingly lower educated men and higher educated women 
who remain unpartnered and childless (Kravdal & Rindfuss, 2008; Wiik & Dommermuth, 2014). 
Moreover, from our results we cannot distinguish between different policy effects. Because parental 
leave benefits are (officially) counted as income, from our data we neither know whom of the partners 
is working or receiving compensation nor do we know how much the leave-taking itself reduces 
incomes due to the compensation ceiling. So, although we need to be cautious about pinpointing 
underlying mechanisms, our study does reveal that new parents are increasingly equal-earners and that 
this pattern shows striking simultaneity with work-family policies that aim at strengthening these 
roles. 
 
However, family policy implementations do not follow a continuum in Norway: Our study period 
ended with a reduction of the fathers’ quota (14 to 10 weeks) and an increase in the monthly sum for 
the cash-for-childcare benefit (see Appendix A). What we might interpret as a trend, might vanish if 
institutional support changes. What is unlikely to change fast, though, is the educational component in 
this picture, namely the first part of the gender revolution (Goldscheider, Bernhardt & Lappegård 
2015). In line with other studies, our results confirm that female education plays a role for provider 
roles in couples. In addition, the finding from the current study implies that increased institutional 
support may advance also the second part of the gender revolution (namely fathers taking more 
responsibility at home). 
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Notes 
1. People with very high incomes do not necessarily receive full income compensation since there is a 
cap equivalent to six times the National Insurance basic amount (G) (1G was approximately 10,400 
Euros in 2014). However, some employees are guaranteed full income compensation from their 
employer even if their income exceeds the ceiling. In addition to the paid parental leave, each parent is 
entitled to one year of unpaid leave with job protection after the paid leave period. 
2. Periods when parents have received sickness benefit, parental benefit, unemployment benefit etc. 
are considered equivalent to work. 
3. Omitting couples where one partner has very low income or is outside the labour force, prevents 
results to be driven by extreme cases such as those where one partner earns 100%. Indeed, without this 
sample specification mothers outside the labour market substantially reduce the average female 
income shares in couples with children below 4 years.  Also, couples without children in the 
household comprise above-average many females that are outside the labour force, further 
emphasizing the heterogeneity of those without income. Around 100,000 couples are dropped each 
year due to this dual-earner specification (e.g., 2014, N=111,721).  
4. The variable was developed by Hoem, Neyer, and Andersson (2006), and has been applied in 
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Appendix A. Family policies and business cycles in Norway 1992-2014a) 
 Parental leave (weeks) Percentage in  
kindergarten 
Cash for childcare Business 
cycle 














Age 1  
 












Benefit per month 
(no daycare) b) 
Unemploy- 
ment rate 
1992 35/44.4 2/6 0 27/36.4 16 29 59 - - - 5.9 
1993 42/52 3/6 4 29/39 18 32 61 - - - 6.0 
1994 42/52 3/6 4 29/39 21 35 64 - - - 5.4 
1995 42/52 3/6 4 29/39 23 39 66 - - - 4.9 
1996 42/52 3/6 4 29/39 26 42 69 - - - 4.8 
1997 42/52 3/6 4 29/39 31 49 73 - - - 4.8 
1998 42/52 3/6 4 29/39 26 52 76 13-24 77 3,000 NOK 3.2 
1999 42/52 3/6 4 29/39 27 45 77 13-36 75 2,263 NOK 3.2 
2000 42/52 3/6 4 29/39 27 46 78 13-36 74 3,000 NOK 3.4 
2001 42/52 3/6 4 29/39 28 48 80 13-36 73 3,000 NOK 3.5 
2002 42/52 3/6 4 29/39 29 51 83 13-36 71 3,000 NOK 3.9 
2003 42/52 3/6 4 29/39 33 52 85 13-36 69 3,675 NOK 4.5 
2004 42/52 3/6 4 29/39 38 58 88 13-36 63 3,675 NOK 4.5 
2005 43/53 3/6 5 29/39 44 66 91 13-36 58 3,675 NOK 4.6 
2006 44/54 3/6 6 29/39 51 73 93 13-35 52 3,303 NOK 3.4 
2007 44/54 3/6 6 29/39 61 79 94 13-35 41 3,303 NOK 2.5 
2008 44/54 3/6 6 29/39 66 86 96 13-35 35 3,303 NOK 2.6 
2009 46/56 3/6 10 27/37 71 86 96 13-35 31 3,303 NOK 3.2 
2010 46/56 3/6 10 27/37 72 90 97 13-35 28 3,303 NOK 3.6 
2011 47/57 3/6 12 26/36 70 90 97 13-35 21 3,303 NOK 3.3 
2012 47/57 3/6 12 26/36 68 90 97 13-23 22 5,500/3,303 NOK c) 3.2 
2013 49/59 3/14 14 18/28 69 89 97 13-23 23 5,500/3,303 NOK 3.5 
2014 49/59 3/10 10 26/36 67 91 97 13-23 23 6,000 NOK 3.5 
a) Source: NOU 2017:6: Offentlig støtte til barnefamiliene. Oslo: Ministry of Children and Equality 
b) Some changes apply from 1. January, and some from 1. August.  
c) Applies to children 13-18/19-23 months  
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Appendix B. Employment and contractual working hours per week among women and men in 
the ages 25-54 in Norway 1992-2014 













Working hours c) 
Part time, 
1-19 hours 
Part time,  




40 hours + 
Part time, 
1-19 hours  
Part time, 20-
36 hours d) 
Full time,  
37-39 hours 
Full time, 
40 hours + 
1992 76 4.1 19 25 48 7 86 5.5 2 3 66 29 
1993 76 4.1 18 26 48 8 85 5.7 2 3 68 27 
1994 76 3.8 18 25 50 7 86 5.0 2 3 69 26 
1995 77 3.7 18 25 50 8 87 4.4 2 3 69 25 
1996 78 3.8 17 24 50 8 88 3.8 3 3 66 28 
1997 80 3.4 17 26 49 8 90 3.0 2 3 67 27 
1998 81 2.3 16 26 50 8 90 2.2 2 3 68 27 
1999 82 2.1 15 26 51 8 90 2.5 2 3 68 26 
2000 82 2.3 14 25 52 9 89 2.9 3 3 70 24 
2001 81 2.5 14 25 54 8 89 2.8 3 4 71 23 
2002 81 2.8 14 24 53 9 88 3.2 3 3 69 25 
2003 80 3.3 13 24 54 8 86 4.3 3 4 69 24 
2004 80 3.4 14 24 54 8 86 4.3 4 4 69 23 
2005 80 3.8 13 24 55 8 86 4.2 3 4 70 22 
2006 81 2.9 13 25 54 8 88 3.0 3 4 68 24 
2007 82 2.0 11 24 56 9 89 1.9 3 4 69 24 
2008 84 1.8 10 24 56 10 90 2.1 3 4 69 25 
2009 84 2.0 10 24 56 10 88 2.8 3 5 68 24 
2010 82 2.5 10 24 57 10 87 3.4 3 4 69 24 
2011 82 2.5 10 24 57 9 87 2.9 3 4 69 24 
2012 82 2.3 10 23 57 11 87 2.9 3 4 69 23 
2013 82 2.9 10 22 57 10 87 2.9 3 4 69 24 
2014 81 3.2 10 20 60 10 86 3.4 3 4 68 24 
a) Persons who performed work for pay or profit for at least one hour in the reference week, or who were temporarily absent from work due to illness, holidays, 
paid parental leave etc.  
b) Unemployed persons in percentage of labour force (employed plus unemployed). Persons who were not employed in the reference week, but who had been 
seeking work during the preceding four weeks, and were available for work in the reference week or within the next two weeks. 
c) Main and secondary jobs.  
d) With exception of persons with 32-36 contractual hours who classify themselves as full-time employed. 
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